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Deliberative Democracy, the Public Interest and the Consociational Model
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 One of the most basic charges levelled at the consociational model is that, although it may provide 
for conflict management, it fails to provide for the longer term goal of conflict resolution.  This 
article seeks to respond to this charge by viewing the consociational model through a deliberative 
democratic lens.  In particular, I argue that deliberative democracy provides normative standards 
that can inform the design of consociational institutions in ways that encourage political leaders to 
focus on the interests of everyone in society, rather than merely on the interests of their own ethnic 
group.  Insofar as consociational institutions, deliberatively conceived, can have this effect, there is 
in principle no reason why they might not also provide for conflict resolution.
 
Consociation is the dominant institutional approach to managing conflict in societies deeply divided 
along ethnic lines (e.g., Lijphart 1977; O’Leary 2005).  That approach supposes that if political 
stability is to be maintained, institutions must be created that enable political leaders from all of the 
main ethnic groups in society to share power within a ‘grand coalition’ government, that promote 
proportionality throughout the public administration, that enable groups to exercise control or 
‘segmental autonomy’ over their own internal affairs, and that enable them to veto political 
decisions that impinge upon their most vital interests.  Yet despite the dominance of this approach, 
the consociational model has been criticised on many grounds (e.g., Horowitz 1991, 2001; Taylor 
2006).  Of those criticisms, perhaps the most basic charge of all is that although consociationalists 
have had much to say about how ethnic conflicts can be managed, they have had far too little to say 
about how those conflicts might eventually be resolved.
 
Consociationalists have responded to this charge by arguing that, while conflict resolution is the 
ultimate goal, the realities of life in many ethnically divided societies are such that conflict 
management must come first (e.g., O’Leary 2005, pp. 8-12).  On one level, it is hard to argue with 
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this response; maintaining political stability is obviously important.  But, on another level, it must 
be remembered that how conflicts are managed in the short run will have implications for whether 
or to what extent they can be resolved in the long run.  Certainly, some consociations develop in 
extremely positive, democratic directions.  Switzerland is an obvious example, as is the case of 
Northern Ireland in more recent times.  Yet the fact remains that consociationalists have not spent 
any great amount of time explaining how a consociation ought to develop or which larger 
democratic purposes it should pursue in the longer run.
 
There is, however, no reason why consociations should not be designed with at least one eye on the 
goal of conflict resolution.  After all, the basic institutional characteristics that define a consociation 
can be, and have been, realised in different ways and in the light of different normative 
considerations (cf. Lijphart 2004, pp. 99ff).  In this article, I therefore propose to take a fresh look at 
the consociational model by viewing it through a deliberative democratic lens.  Central to this 
deliberative perspective is the idea that political leaders should seek what is best in the public 
interest rather than merely what is best in the interest of their own ethnic group.  In showing how a 
set of consociational institutions can be shaped by this idea, it is possible to see how political 
leaders might be encouraged or even induced to think about the good of society at large, and hence 
to see how the consociational model might provide for conflict resolution.
 
Admittedly, the fact that there is disagreement about almost every political decision has led some 
people to be sceptical of the idea of the public interest.  But as I argue in the opening section of this 
article, something can be in the public interest while still arousing opposition from some.  The 
challenge, however, is to get people to think not just about how a decision might affect them in 
some private capacity, but how it might affect them in their capacity as a member of the public.  In 
the second section, I show how a deliberative conception of democracy can enable us to meet this 
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challenge.  More specifically, I show how, by requiring us to convince rather than merely outvote or 
outmanoeuvre one another, deliberative democracy leads to decisions that are, in a meaningful 
sense, in the public interest.  In the final section, I take up the challenge of showing how 
deliberative democracy can shape the design of consociational institutions and in particular the 
structure of political incentives on offer within them.  As we will see, although some aspects are 
more tractable than others, deliberative democracy can inform the overall design of a consociation 
so that it can, in principle, pave the way for future conflict resolution.
 
Before proceeding with this argument, it is perhaps worth stressing just why it makes sense, or 
rather just why it is necessary, to read consociation through a normative lens of the sort that 
deliberative democracy provides.  Consociationalists typically use the phrase ‘consociational 
democracy’ rather than ‘the consociational model’ or some such phrase.  But ‘consociation’ and 
‘democracy’ are not the same thing: whereas consociation is an empirical theory that (among other 
things) seeks to explain in institutional terms how a deeply divided society can nevertheless be 
politically stable, democracy is a normative theory that (among other things) enables us to make 
evaluative judgements about the various forms that consociational institutions might conceivably 
take (cf. Lustick 1997, pp. 108-109).  Of course, democracy itself comes in many forms.  But the 
fact remains that a specifically democratic consociation cannot be defended solely from within the 
bounds of consociational thinking.  After all, there can be both democratic and non-democratic 
consociations (e.g., Yugoslavia under Tito had consociational structures for governing at the federal 
level).
 
In fairness, some consociationalists do recognise this much (e.g., Lijphart 1995; cf. O’Leary 2005, 
pp. 9-10).  But, in the main, consociationalists have not spent any great amount of time explaining 
what they mean by ‘democracy’ or defending the particular version of it they prefer.  They might, of 
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course, think that it is up to the members of a divided societies to decide for themselves what their 
democracy ought to look like, or how it ought to develop over the course of time.  But the trouble 
with piecemeal approaches of this sort is that it makes it very hard to plan for the future or to 
provide deeply divided societies with the social, political and even moral direction they so badly 
need (Goodin 1982, pp. 3-4).
 
The public interest
 
On a deliberative understanding of democracy, political decisions turn not merely on the force of 
numbers, but on what Jürgen Habermas has termed ‘the force of the better argument’ (Habermas 
1984, p. 25).  Later in this article, I will explain how this deliberative understanding might shape the 
design of consociational institutions so as to promote thinking in terms of the public interest.  But 
first I wish to explain what I mean by the idea of the public interest and why its use is justifiable, 
even in the case of a deeply divided society.
 
‘The public interest’ is a perfectly familiar idea from everyday political life.  To say that a decision 
is in the public interest is simply to say that it is in the interest of everyone in society (Barry 1964, 
p. 1; Douglass 1980, p. 104).  Yet while many people tend to think that the public interest is of 
decisive importance in choosing policies, very often the thing that is said to be in the public interest 
is not, on the face of it, in the interest of some people.  For example, while the government may say 
that a ban on the public display of certain ethnic flags and emblems is in the public interest, that ban 
is not in the interest of those who want to express their ethnicity on such terms.  Or while the 
government may say that a ban on ethnic protests or parades is in the public interest, that ban is not 
in the interest of those who want to politically mobilise or express their culture in those ways.
4
 Disagreements of this sort are not unique to deeply divided societies.  They can attach to the 
adoption of almost any public policy in any democratic state—so much so that some people have 
been quite sceptical of the idea of the public interest (e.g., Dahl 1989, p. 280ff).  In particular, some 
pluralists have argued that the public interest is an incoherent idea that blinds us to the fact that our 
political world is mainly comprised of conflicting private (or special or sectional, as opposed to 
public) interests, whereas others have argued that it is little more than a smoke screen used by 
government to cover the fact that most political decisions are biased in favour of the more powerful 
in society.  
 
If those arguments were correct, they would damage, if not altogether undermine, the case for 
deliberative democracy (Shapiro 2003, pp. 21ff).  After all, many deliberative democrats 
characterise their position in terms of a contrast between a politics of pluralistic competition, in 
which people seek to advance their own private interest, and a politics of the common good, in 
which people seek what is best in the public interest (e.g., Elster 1986; Cohen 1989).  Needless to 
say, it would also prove extremely damaging to the prospects for conflict resolution in deeply 
divided societies.  If statements about the public interest turned out to be nothing more than hollow 
rhetoric, there would be little point in encouraging the members of conflicting ethnic groups to take 
the broader view or to think of the good of society as a whole.  Of course, each side may come to 
accept the need for cooperation for reasons of their own.  But if there were no public interest to 
pursue, the fact that everyone benefitted would be merely incidental (Diggs 1973, p. 287).
 
In his early, but arguably unsurpassed, essay on the public interest, Brian Barry tackled the sceptics 
head on (Barry 1964).  In particular, he sought to explain conflicts between the public interest and 
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the interests of particular individuals or groups in terms of a conflict between different social roles 
or capacities.  A ban on the public display of ethnic flags and emblems, or on ethnic protests and 
parades, does not appear to be in the interest of those who find such things important.  But, as Barry 
points out, appearances can be deceptive.  In my capacity as a member of an ethnic group, I may 
have little to gain from such a ban.  But, in my capacity as a member of the public, I stand to gain 
with all the rest from living in a society in which civil order in maintained or in which the risk of 
civil unrest is reduced (Barry 1964, pp. 14-15).
 
In drawing our attention to the different roles or capacities in which we sometimes find ourselves, 
Barry shows that there is nothing incoherent about saying that a decision can be in the public 
interest even when it is opposed by some people.  Of course, his argument does not suppose (nor 
need it suppose) that there must be a public interest on every issue.  Obviously, on some issues 
people simply have conflicting interests and some end up winners and others losers.  Indeed, it is 
probably as foolish to say that there must be a public interest on every issue as it is to say that there 
is never a public interest on any issue.  But in any event, the point remains that the idea of the 
public interest does not have to exclude the possibility that some people whom a public interest 
encompasses may have private interests that conflict with it.
 
Even so, Barry’s argument takes us only so far (cf. Pettit 2004, pp. 157ff).  In particular, it leaves 
unexplained why people should be willing to give priority to the public interest, or how they might 
be encouraged to think more like members of the public and less like private individuals or groups.  
Again, the problem here is not unique to deeply divided societies, although it can be especially 
acute in such societies.  In agreeing to share power, ethnic groups agree to live together under a 
common political framework.  Self-interested considerations may loom large.  But there is no 
principled reason why the agreement should not also involve a concern for the public interest, 
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however fragile or tentative that concern may be.  After all, there would be little point in ethnic 
groups agreeing to live together unless they were committed, at some level, to the good of society 
as a whole.  Yet when the public interest conflicts with the interest of some particular ethnic group, 
circumstances are often such that the public interest may seem to matter very little.  This is 
particularly so at times of heightened insecurity or uncertainty, when people are deeply worried 
about the future of their group.  They might recognise that civil peace is in the interest of everyone 
in society.  But they might nevertheless conclude that flying their flags or engaging in ethnic 
protests and parades is more important to them, and hence have a net interest in opposing the ban.  
 
In such cases, it is tempting to conclude that the public interest has to be balanced against the 
special interests involved and cannot therefore be followed exclusively for fear of destabilising the 
political system.  This, in effect, is where Barry leaves us in his discussion of the public interest 
(Barry 1964, p. 16).  Yet it is far from clear that we must settle for this conclusion or accept that a 
concern for conflict management must simply outweigh any more principled concern for the public 
interest.  Barry takes interests as given: people want certain things, whatever those things happen to 
be, for whatever reason they happen to want them.  But this approach is far more suited to private 
decisions than it is to public decisions, because our views about our own interests can never be 
decisive in the public realm in the way they can be in the private realm.  Since our political 
preferences have implications for other people, and since other people have a political standing that 
is equal to our own, we should be prepared to take their interests into account when deciding 
matters of common political concern (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, p. 53).  In other words, we 
should be prepared to think about the public interest, no matter what sort of democratic society we 
live in, divided or otherwise.
 
And so, when it comes to decisions that bind us all, the challenge is how to get people to behave 
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less like private individuals and more like members of the public (or, when it comes to 
consociational structures for governing, how to get political leaders to behave not just as the 
guardians of special interests but also as statesmen devoted to the public interest).  As I will argue 
in the next section, deliberative democracy seeks to meet this challenge by structuring the terms of 
political engagement, first and foremost, around a requirement of reciprocity.  Insofar as that 
requirement can be successfully realised, it can encourage people to couch their arguments in terms 
that are accessible to everybody and could in principle be accepted by anyone.  As a result, the 
decisions that are reached will reflect not simply their prior interests, but the judgements that they 
make having reflecting on the arguments made on all sides (Miller 2000, p. 142).  In some cases, 
people may come to realise that their share in the public interest is more weighty than it seemed.  It 
may even lead them to conclude that the public interest must come first, even at the cost of their 
own private interests—not simply because that is what the pragmatics of the case require, but 
because that is what our standing as political equals entails.  
 
Deliberative democracy
 
As I mentioned earlier, deliberative democracy is based on the idea that political decisions should 
turn not on the force of numbers but on the force of the better argument.  To this end, arguments 
about matters of common political concern must be couched in terms that are accessible to 
everybody and could in principle be accepted by anyone (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, pp. 3-4; 
Barry 2006, p. 22).  Thus, for example, we cannot simply claim that a decision is justified because it 
is what God wants, because that argument will not be rationally acceptable to those who do not 
share our faith, even if it is intelligible to them.  Instead, the arguments that we make should be 
couched in terms of values and standards that are broadly shared—or should refer to reasons that 
are public rather than private in character and inclusive rather than exclusive in scope (Cohen 1996, 
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pp. 99-100).  
 
Of course, one might question whether this ‘requirement of reciprocity’, as it is often called, is 
unique to deliberative democracy or whether it can be used to distinguish a deliberative conception 
of democracy from other conceptions (Weale 1999, p. 37).  Since in practice all democratic 
governments must explain at least some of their decisions on terms that are accessible and 
acceptable to all of those who are bound by them, all plausible democratic models must make room 
for reciprocity.  Or, alternatively, one might question whether a deliberative conception could be 
uniquely concerned with reciprocity.  Even if people make a sincere attempt to meet this 
requirement, they may still end up disagreeing, and indeed sometimes disagreeing more profoundly 
than they did before (Waldron 2000, p. 219).  Consequently, any plausible deliberative account of 
the institutional conditions under which political decisions should be made must make room for a 
range of other activities, such as bargaining and voting, in order to deal with the differences that 
remain once deliberation has run its course.
 
Deliberative democrats do not deny that reciprocity is common to other democratic conceptions 
(e.g., Gutmann and Thompson 2002, pp. 155-156).  Nor do they deny that deliberative democracy 
must make room for bargaining, voting and so forth (e.g., Habermas 1996, pp. 165-166).  However, 
what marks deliberative democracy out as a distinct conception of democracy is the primacy that it 
affords to reciprocity.  In a deliberative conception, reciprocity is not merely one component of 
democracy, or one principled requirement among many, but shapes the meaning of other political 
principles and colours the design of political institutions (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, p. 53; but 
see Weale 2007, p. 81).  Where we position the various requirements of democracy and the relative 
weight that we afford to them will distinguish one model of democracy from the next.  But, insofar 
as our preferred conception of democracy makes the requirement of reciprocity the touchstone of all 
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else, that conception may properly be described as ‘deliberative’ (Cohen 1996, pp. 99-101).
 
Admittedly, questions of practical feasibility will temper this last statement somewhat, a point to 
which I will return in just a moment.  First, though, I wish to explain how reciprocity promotes 
thinking in terms of the public interest.  As Joshua Cohen argues, by ‘requiring reasons acceptable 
to others, the deliberative view suggests an especially compelling picture of the possible relations 
among people within a democratic order’ (Cohen 1996, p. 101).  The starting point for that picture 
is the fact that, in any free society, people will tend to view the world in different and sometimes 
conflicting ways.  For deliberative democrats, this variation in human outlook is perfectly natural.  
But it carries with it important normative implications for how we should relate to one another as 
fellow democrats.  On a deliberative understanding, recognising others as equals in political 
argument means recognising that those others can have reasons to hold their views as firmly as we 
hold ours.  Accordingly, if we do not make a serious effort to deliberate with them and try to find 
reasons that they could in principle accept, we fail to respect their standing as political equals.  
 
Thus, on this picture of the terms of democratic engagement, the requirement of reciprocity 
promotes thinking in terms of the public interest because the particular account of political equality 
with which it is bound up admonishes us to treat each member of society as someone worth 
convincing rather than as someone whom we simply need to outvote or outmanoeuvre (Cohen 
1996, p. 101; Dworkin 2006, p. 132-133).  In other words, the particular account of political 
equality with which it is bound up admonishes us to try to see things as others see them and hence 
to take their views into consideration when thinking about our own.  We may ultimately conclude 
that our particular view of things is best or that, on balance, our arguments were better supported by 
the values and standards that are common to us all.  But insofar as the conclusions that we reach 
take the views of others into account, those judgements can be viewed as authentic, or at least 
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informed and mutually respectful, expressions of the public interest (cf. Pettit 2004, p. 163).  
 
In this way, then, deliberative democracy, and in particular the requirement of reciprocity that is 
central to it, seeks to encourage people to approach matters of common political concern in their 
capacity as members of the public, and not just in their capacity as private individuals.  As such, 
deliberative democracy not only coheres with Barry’s argument in defence of the public interest 
discussed in the last section of this article, but extends that argument in important ways.  Whereas, 
in the end, Barry seems pessimistic about getting people to think in public interest terms, 
deliberative democracy suggests a far more optimistic view.  Admittedly, deliberative democracy is 
an ideal; and, as with any normative ideal, the crucial test is whether it can provide sound practical 
guidance in a given empirical context.  So what reasons might there be for thinking that a 
conception of democracy that places reciprocity at its centre must fail this test when confronted by 
the challenges of decision making in a deeply divided society?  There are two obvious possibilities.
 
First, one might think that the common values and standards upon which reciprocity depends will 
be largely absent in such societies.  But this is not the case.  While it may be true that most peace 
agreements are the product of a bargain struck between political leaders seeking the best terms 
possible for their own ethnic group, they also reserve a special place for common political values 
(Noel 2006, p. 421).  For example, whereas Irish nationalists endorsed the Belfast Agreement 
because it held out the promise of achieving a united Ireland, British unionists endorsed it because it 
held out the best opportunity of reconciling nationalists to the union (O’Leary 1999, p. 68).  But 
unionists and nationalists also expressly committed themselves to ‘partnership, equality and mutual 
respect as the basis of relationships within Northern Ireland’ and ‘to the achievement of 
reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights 
of all’  (Agreement 1998, ‘Declaration of Support’, paras. 2-5).  In other words, they committed 
11
themselves to the sort of common values and standards that are at issue here.
 
Secondly, one might think that even if certain values and standards are widely shared, they will give 
rise to interpretative disputes that are bitter enough to induce further political instability (Horton 
2003, pp. 14-21).  This need not be taken to mean that the members of a divided society are more 
unreasonable than anyone else or that they inherently lack the right kinds of democratic 
dispositions.  It may simply mean that the experience of protracted conflict has left them deeply 
suspicious of one another, with each side interpreting the arguments made by the other simply as 
covers for its own sectional interests.  This point is well taken.  Yet although the members of a 
deeply divided society may have little confidence in one another, they may have significantly more 
confidence in the political institutions under which they have agreed to live—if, that is, those 
institutions have been designed so that each person has good reason to believe that the interests of 
his or her group are being treated with equal consideration. 
 
Once situated within a deliberative conception of democracy, this last claim translates into the claim 
that political institutions should be designed so that each of us has good reason to believe that the 
requirement of reciprocity has been be met.  There may be any number of more or less relevant 
considerations here (e.g., questions concerning the role of money, judicial review, civil society, 
freedom of the press and the prevailing balance of power more generally).  But for deliberative 
democrats, one crucial consideration is whether political institutions have been designed so that 
their internal workings will be open or transparent—not just so that those of us on the outside will 
be able to make informed judgements about what goes on within them, but so that those on the 
inside will be forced to couch their arguments or defend their decisions in terms of common values.  
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The driving assumption here is that there are certain arguments that simply cannot be stated 
publicly.  In an open political debate, it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution 
should be chosen just because it is good for oneself, since to do so would excite ridicule and 
contempt (Goodin 1992, pp. 124, 132; cf. Elster 1998, pp. 109-111).  Curiously, deliberative 
democrats have not paid much attention to the fact that this assumption may hold only insofar as 
institutions are arranged so that the positions of those who work within them are made to depend in 
appropriate ways not just on the perceptions of their own supporters, but on the views and opinions 
of society at large (cf. Chambers 2004, p. 404).  If political leaders do not have to care about what 
people in general think, they may be not in the slightest concerned about the fact that everyone can 
see what they are up to (e.g., Slobodan Milošević did not care too much about how he was 
perceived by Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims, presumably because he thought he did not have to).   
Of course, in practice, it can be difficult to arrange political institutions not just so that they are 
open, but open in ways that can be realistically expected to improve political behaviour (an issue to 
which I return frequently in the next section on the design of consociational institutions).  But 
insofar as they can be arranged in such a way, there is reason to think that they will foster 
reciprocity and hence focus debate on the public interest.
 
Again, this ‘requirement of publicity’ is not unique to deliberative conceptions of democracy.  
Publicity is a cornerstone of democracy generally and of representative democracy in particular.  
However, in a deliberative democracy, the special place and value afforded to publicity derives from 
the contribution that it makes to promoting reciprocity.  Insofar as political leaders will not want to 
be seen making naked appeals to private interest or prejudice in political debates, publicity will 
force them to couch their arguments in terms of common values.  Of course, publicity cannot 
guarantee this, since, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, ‘Publicity … is no impediment to evil nor 
stimulus to good if the public will not look at what is done’ (Mill 1991 [1861], p. 228).  Nor is it the 
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case that publicity is necessary to reciprocity, since political leaders may already recognise a duty to 
promote the public interest.  Still, experience suggests that, left to their own devices, political 
leaders may show concern only for the interests of their own supporters, if even that much, unless 
they can be made to behave otherwise.
 
Not all deliberative democrats treat publicity in this instrumental way.  For example, Amy Gutmann 
and Dennis Thompson argue that it is morally wrong, in and of itself, to impose political decisions 
that were not made under conditions of openness or transparency (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 
pp. 98-101).  Yet one difficulty with arguing for publicity in this way is that it can make it hard to 
account for the fact that secrecy can also have an important role to play in promoting deliberation.  
We know from the conflict mediation literature that political leaders can find it very hard to back 
down from a position once they have stated it openly, for fear of appearing weak or indecisive in the 
eyes of their supporters (e.g., du Toit 2003, pp. 66-67).  For this reason, mediation scholars argue 
that political leaders should conduct at least some of their deliberations behind closed doors, since 
doing so can allow them to speak candidly, to change position and to accept compromises without 
constantly worrying about what those on the outside might have to say (e.g., Harris and Reilly 
1998, p. 85).  However, if one takes a moral approach to publicity, then arguments of this sort seem 
to amount to a triumph of political expedience over political principle.  Admittedly, Gutmann and 
Thompson argue that as long as the agreement that is reached is subsequently debated publicly or in 
full view, the problem here can be ameliorated.  Nevertheless, the point remains that, from a 
principled perspective, ‘retrospective’ publicity is a second-best alternative.
 
By contrast, if one takes an instrumental approach, there is not the same difficulty here: if secrecy 
serves reciprocity better than publicity, then so be it.  Of course, matters are not as simple as that.  
As I indicated above, publicity is a cornerstone of democracy because it gives us reason to think 
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that our views will be treated with equal consideration by those in political power.  But since 
secrecy denies us that reason, the presumption should always be in favour of publicity.  Precisely 
how that balance will need to be struck is an empirical question which cannot be answered from 
within the bounds of political theory (Chambers 2005, pp. 259ff; Thompson 2008, p. 510).  
However, empirical considerations do not change the basic fact that political theory has a vital role 
to play in shaping the design of political institutions and the direction in which they ought to move.  
Many details will need to be worked out on the ground.  Yet if we really wish to see democracy 
flourish, we will need to have some idea of the goals and values our empirical endeavours are meant 
to serve.
 
The consociational model
 
The question, therefore, is whether consociational institutions can be designed so that political 
leaders are effectively required to think of themselves not simply as the representatives of their own 
ethnic group, but also as sincere and faithful representatives of the public interest.  In other words, 
the question is whether consociational institutions can be arranged so that they change the way in 
which political leaders approach common problems and hence pave the way not just for conflict 
management but also, in the longer run, for conflict resolution.
 
As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, the four institutional characteristics that define a 
consociation (i.e., a grand coalition government, segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual 
vetoes) can be realised in an indeterminate number of ways.  For example, the grand coalition 
government can operate within a parliamentary (e.g., Macedonia) or a presidential (e.g., 
Afghanistan) system, segmental autonomy can be territorial (e.g., Switzerland) or functional (e.g., 
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Lebanon), national elections can be run using, for example, party-list PR (e.g., South Africa) or PR-
STV (e.g., Northern Ireland), and veto points can be formally enshrined at the constitutional level 
(e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina) or operate by convention (e.g., Belgium).  Conventionally, however, 
the choice of one particular form of institution over another has not been justified by appeal to an 
independently justifiable theory of democracy, but by appeal to what the empirical evidence 
suggests will work best in any given case.  In saying this I do not mean to deny the importance of 
empirical research; any such denial would be silly.  Rather, the point is that divided societies need 
not just sound practical advice, but also clear normative direction if they are to deal forthrightly and 
in depth with their most pressing problems.
 
So let us consider what deliberative democracy has to say about how consociational institutions 
should be realised.  As we will see, the potential for deliberative democracy may be stronger at 
some points of a consociational system than at others.  However, insofar as the system as a whole is 
driven by a concern for reciprocity, what results can be described as a ‘deliberative consociation’ 
(see Mansbridge 1999, p. 224).
 
Segmental autonomy
 
Segmental autonomy has an important role to play in managing ethnic conflicts.  Since it gives 
groups the authority to govern their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and 
culture, it can help them to maintain their distinct ethnic identity.  Moreover, since it delegates a 
certain level of power and resources to the political leaders of those groups, it encourages them to 
support the political system as a whole and hence helps to maintain political stability (Lijphart 
2004, p. 97).  
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 Yet although segmental autonomy can help to manage conflicts in the short run, the worry is that it 
can make it harder to resolve them in the long run (cf. Dryzek 2005, p. 222).  In deeply divided 
societies, concerns about security will typically drive people to live within their own ethnic 
enclaves, to marry within their own traditions, to send their children to segregated schools, and so 
forth.  As a result, they may go their entire lives without ever engaging in a serious conversation 
with someone from the other side.  Clearly, the members of one ethnic group cannot be forced to 
talk to those of another.  But the more segmental autonomy reinforces their sense that they are 
living and acting within discrete political systems, the more difficult it becomes to deal with 
common problems or to accept that sometimes it is important to think more as a member of the 
public and less as a member of an ethnic group.
 
Cast in deliberative terms, the worry is that segmental autonomy may do little or nothing to 
encourage people to meet the requirement of reciprocity.  Indeed, far from encouraging group 
members to couch their arguments in terms that could be accepted by those outside the group, 
segmental autonomy may actually increase the chances that their deliberations will conform to what 
Cass Sunstein calls ‘the law of group polarisation’ (Sunstein 2002).  That law refers to a statistical 
regularity which allows us to predict that when like-minded people meet to discuss an issue of 
importance to them, they will move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the 
median point of their prior views and opinions (Sunstein 2002, p. 176).  Of course, the mere fact of 
moving in a more extreme direction is neither good nor bad in itself.  But if people only engage in 
political discussions with members of their own ethnic group, the chances are that they will become 
more entrenched in their views and hence less responsive to the views of others.
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We cannot totally remove the threat that segmental autonomy poses to reciprocity or to the 
prospects for deliberative democracy more generally.  But what we can do is ensure that segmental 
autonomy is organised in such a way that reciprocity becomes more likely.  As we have seen, 
publicity can be an engine of reciprocity.  So what does publicity imply for our thinking about 
segmental autonomy?  It implies that segmental autonomy should be realised along voluntary rather 
than compulsory lines.  The reasoning here is this.  The more that segmental autonomy locks people 
into the groups to which they happen to belong (e.g., by compelling them to send their children to a 
certain type of school or by forcing them to speak a certain language), the fewer the chances they 
will have to engage with others in society or, indeed, to challenge group assumptions from within.  
By contrast, the more that people can treat segmental autonomy as a voluntary matter, the more 
comfortable they may feel about looking beyond the boundaries of their own ethnic group.  But 
since that also means that those on the outside will have greater opportunities to see or hear what is 
going on within the group, everyone is pressed to meet the requirement of reciprocity.
 
Admittedly, there is a problem of institutional indeterminacy here.  While openness and 
transparency may increase the level of social pressure on group members to care about what others 
in society think, it is not clear what the cost might be for someone who chose to ignore that 
pressure. Consequently, it is hard to specify the extent to which publicity will serve as an engine of 
reciprocity when segmental autonomy is realised along voluntary lines.  What needs to be 
remembered, however, is that segmental autonomy must not be viewed in isolation from the other 
aspects of a consociational system: although the incentive to meet the requirement of reciprocity 
may be weak at certain points, it may be possible to compensate for those weaknesses at other 
points.
 
Proportionality
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 Proportionality rules can operate at various points throughout a consociation, governing, for 
example, the allocation of civil service appointments or questions of fiscal redistribution.  Yet since 
many scholars argue that the most important choice facing constitution writers is that of a 
parliamentary electoral system, that is the aspect which we will focus on here (e.g., Lijphart 2004; 
Horowitz 2003; Reilly 2001).
 
The thinking behind all proportional representation (PR) systems is to produce a fairly close fit 
between votes cast and seats won, so that if a party wins, say, 35 per cent of the vote it should win 
roughly 35 per cent of the seats in parliament.  In a deeply divided society, where voters tend to 
vote along ethnic lines, this effectively means that all significant groups will have a genuine stake in 
the political system and even the chance to reform it from within (Lijphart 2004, p. 99; McGarry 
and O’Leary 2004, p. 25).  The question, however, is which of the many forms of PR one should 
choose?  In the first instance, consociationalists answer this question by looking at what the 
empirical evidence has to say about the contribution different PR systems might or might not make 
to managing conflict; in the first instance, deliberative democrats answer this question by evaluating 
the extent to which different PR systems might or might satisfy the requirement of reciprocity 
(although empirical considerations will matter here, too, just as normative considerations will 
matter to consociationalists). 
 
For example, some consociationalists favour party-list PR on the grounds that it ‘can encourage the 
formation and maintenance of strong and cohesive political parties’ (Lijphart 2004, p. 101).  Yet 
although party cohesion may promote political stability, it may do little to promote thinking in terms 
of the public interest during the course of an electoral campaign.  As I have just remarked, voters in 
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a deeply divided society tend to vote for their own ethnic parties.  But since party-list allows them 
to vote for only one party, the parties themselves have no particular reason to worry about how they 
are perceived by those outside the group and hence no particular incentive to meet the requirement 
of reciprocity, no matter how open or transparent the election turns out to be.  Indeed, the fact that 
voters can only vote for one party may actively discourage parties from couching their arguments in 
terms that outsiders could accept.  Since elections tend to take place within groups rather than 
across them, parties must always be careful not to appear soft in the eyes of their supporters for fear 
of losing votes to hard-line rivals (Horowitz 1991, pp. 173-174; cf. James 2004, pp. 166-167).
 
By contrast, there is reason to think that the Single Transferrable Vote (STV) form of PR is much 
more in tune with the requirements of deliberative democracy.  STV is a preferential system that 
operates in multimember constituencies.  As such, voters vote for candidates rather than for parties; 
they also get to rank candidates in order of their preference (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, p. 27).  
Thus, while voters will normally tend to rank candidates from their own ethnic group first, they 
may be willing to place candidates from another ethnic group somewhere lower down the ballot.  In 
marginal seats, where lower-order preferences may make the difference between winning and 
losing, candidates have a real incentive to care about how they are publicly perceived, not just by 
their the members of their own ethnic group, but by society at large.  Hence, they have a real 
incentive to couch their arguments in terms that anyone could accept.  
 
In practice, however, matters may not be as straightforward as this.  STV can induce political 
leaders to meet the requirement of reciprocity and hence to behave more like statesmen concerned 
to advance the public interest and less like ethnic guardians concerned only to advance the interests 
of their own group.  But, as I have just suggested, it may only do so in cases where constituencies 
are highly mixed or where seats are marginal.  And even then the incentive may not be terribly 
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strong, since parties will need to consider how they are perceived over the whole territory, rather 
than in just one constituency.  So, while STV does offer clear incentives for deliberation (or specific 
sanctions for not deliberating) in a way that voluntary forms of segmental autonomy arguably do 
not, the contingent nature of those incentives means that we must continue to look for opportunities 
to institutionalise the requirement of reciprocity at other points in a consociational system.
 
Grand governing coalition
 
Although the various elements of a consociation are mutually implicating, the special place afforded 
to the grand coalition within the consociational model stems not just from the fact that it is the 
primary site of political cooperation and decision making, but because its successful functioning is 
absolutely critical to political stability (Lijphart 1977, pp. 25-36).  If political leaders representing 
the main ethnic groups in society fail to share power at the cabinet or executive level, there will be 
little or no hope for democracy in divided societies—little hope for conflict management and no 
hope for conflict resolution.
 
Given the uncertainties that attach to segmental autonomy and proportionality in the electoral 
system, it becomes all the more important to think about how the grand governing coalition might 
be designed so that it compensates for those uncertainties.  One crucial consideration here is how a 
grand coalition is actually formed, and how that formation process affects subsequent political 
behaviour.  Empirically, the formation process can vary from one consociation to another.  In some 
cases, seats in government are reserved for particular ethnic groups (as in the case of the Bosnian 
House of Peoples), whereas in others, seats are automatically allocated to parties in proportion to 
the seats they hold in parliament (as in the case of the Northern Ireland Executive).  However, the 
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fact that seats are allocated automatically means that parties have no particular incentive to care 
about how they are perceived by those outside their group (of course, they may care about what 
others think, but not because the formation process make them do so).  Under such conditions, 
publicity may, as I have been suggesting, make little or no difference: although the formation 
process may be entirely open or transparent, it may not act as an engine of reciprocity or promote 
thinking in terms of the public interest.
 
The challenge, therefore, is to consciously arrange the process by which a grand coalition comes 
into being so that success or failure is made to depend on the views and opinions of society at large, 
rather than on those of some particular ethnic group.  One way in which this might be achieved is to 
make government formation depend on voluntary agreement rather than on automatic appointment, 
with government ministers having to secure weighted majority support from across the parliament 
as a whole in order to guarantee power sharing (akin to the Lebanese Council of Ministers) (Wilson 
and Wilford 2003).  Prospective coalition partners from across the ethnic divide might engage in a 
fair deal of bargaining behind the scenes, as they jockey for position within the executive, in search 
of key ministerial portfolios for themselves.  But, just like any other coalition, they will also know 
that they will have to work together in order to function successfully and to protect themselves 
against the criticisms of opposition parties seeking to gain executive power for themselves.  Under 
such conditions, positions of power really do depend on how political leaders are publicly 
perceived.  Since any cracks or weaknesses will be exploited by rival parties, ministers have the 
strongest possible incentive to present a united front and defend their decisions on terms that 
anyone could accept.  
 
Admittedly, it might be objected that this proposal might deny hardliners—who, almost by 
definition, will be unlikely to meet the requirement of reciprocity—the place in government that 
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they might have under an automatic appointment process.  There might be serious issues of stability 
here, since it is not clear how they might react.  Indeed, as conflict resolution scholars warn, 
hardliners will often try to ‘spoil’ a peace process from within, purely for reasons of personal gain 
(e.g., Stedman 1997; Zartman 2001).  Yet, besides the fact that hardliners can be just as susceptible 
to institutional incentives as anyone else—and hence may be just as likely to meet the requirement 
of reciprocity if it has been adroitly realised—there is also the fact that this objection carries little in 
the way of normative weight (O’Flynn 2007, pp. 750-751).  Claiming that political leaders should 
not be guaranteed a place in government is very different from claiming that they should be denied 
a place in government.  The latter claim is unjustifiably exclusionary.  The former claim is 
exclusionary only to the extent that political leaders must convince potential coalition partners from 
across the ethnic divide of their willingness to work together in the service of the public interest.
 
Mutual vetoes
 
On the face of it, mutual vetoes have an obvious role to play in maintaining political stability in a 
deeply divided society—knowing that their most vital interests will be protected from the threat of 
majority tyranny can give ethnic groups the confidence to engage politically with one another 
(Lijphart 1977, pp. 36-37).  It is even possible to see how mutual vetoes might play their part in 
promoting thinking in terms of the public interest—mutual vetoes can encourage ethnic groups to 
think of themselves as forming a single democratic public, because, to borrow a phrase from 
Rousseau, ‘their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for 
ourselves’ (Rousseau 1973 [1762] p. 205).   
 
The trouble, however, is that mutual vetoes may have no such effect.  Instead of giving ethnic 
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groups the confidence to work together, they may instead invite minority tyranny or lead to political 
deadlock.  By way of example, one might point to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which an 
extensive system of vetoes (in combination with an imbalance of power favouring the two regional 
or ‘entity’ governments over the central or federal government) has resulted in continuing problems 
of state paralysis which are frequently left to the Office of the High Representative of the 
international community to resolve.  Far from promoting thinking in terms of the public interest, 
vetoes have arguably played into the hands of wartime nationalist leaders willing to play the ethnic 
card (Zahar 2004).
 
And yet examples of this latter sort simply reinforce the fundamental point driving this article.  As I 
noted in my introductory remarks, some consociations develop in extremely positive, democratic 
directions.  Yet, as I also stressed, if conflict resolution is to be a realistic goal, democratic 
flourishing should not be left to chance but should instead be directed in the light of clear normative 
standards.  So let us see, then, how deliberative democracy might inform the design of mutual 
vetoes within a consociational system.  
 
Earlier, I said that publicity can make it hard for political leaders to back down from a position once 
they have stated it openly, for fear of appearing weak or indecisive; by contrast, deliberating behind 
closed doors can make it easier for them to speak candidly, to change positions and to accept 
compromises; in other words, secrecy can sometimes facilitate reciprocity better than publicity.  The 
point here applies all the more strongly to the use of vetoes.  If it is hard to back down from a claim 
once it has been publicly stated, it must be doubly hard to do so in cases where a veto has also been 
invoked.  Accordingly, if we take a concern for reciprocity and the public interest as our starting 
point, as deliberative democracy says we should, there is reason to think that vetoes should not be 
placed within parliament, where the openness of the forum might easily induce political deadlock 
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(but see Steiner et al. 2004, p. 120).  Instead, they should be placed within the decision procedures 
of the grand governing coalition, to be used behind closed doors, where the danger of deadlock may 
be reduced.  
 
This does not mean giving up on the requirement of publicity, however .  On the contrary, the fact 
that secrecy and publicity are used ‘sequentially’ may, in fact, enhance the prospects for reciprocity 
and thinking in terms of the public interest (see Goodin 2005, p. 193).  Placing vetoes within the 
decision procedures of the grand coalition allows government ministers from one side of the ethnic 
divide to veto decisions proposed by ministers from the other side.  This much will be widely 
know.  Accordingly, when a ministers finally goes public with a decision, the justification that he or 
she provides to parliament will have to be couched in terms that could be accepted by all sides and 
that therefore takes the views and opinions of everyone in society into account.  Otherwise, the 
members of one ethnic group will be bound to ask why their ministers did not veto the decision.  A 
grand governing coalition that is made to operate in this way will be a coalition that meets the 
requirement of reciprocity, that serves the public interest and that furthers the cause of conflict 
resolution.
 
Conclusion
 
As B.J. Diggs has pointed out, the public interest is determined by finding equitable solutions to 
common problems ‘that arise from all members of society reasonably wanting various things, from 
their having to depend on one another to get them, and form each person’s being entitled, both as a 
person and as a citizen, to equal respect and consideration’ (Diggs 1973, p. 290).  Stated thus, there 
is no clear distinction between the empirical concerns of consociationalism and the normative 
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concerns of deliberative democracy: the public interest is the product of both sorts of consideration.  
It is important, however, not to conflate the two.
 
Some consociations survive and prosper, with shared systems of government and agreed or 
integrated structures for the delivery of public services, whereas others barely move beyond the 
conflict management stage.  It is not always easy to isolate what it is that makes the difference, or to 
take the lessons learned from one consociation and apply them to another.  Empirical research 
certainly has a role to play in helping us on our way, as does practical experience more generally.  
We need to have some idea of which results will follow from which institutional proposals, which 
consociational institutions are more likely to remain stable in the given circumstances. But we also 
need to know which results we should prefer and strive to achieve in the first instance, since 
democracy must not be left to chance (Goodin 1982, pp. 4, 7).  
 
Deeply divided societies need not just sound practical advice, but also clear normative direction.  In 
this article, I have argued that deliberative democracy allows us to take a fresh look at the 
consociational model by holding up normative standards in light of which its basic institutional 
characteristics might plausibly be realised.  Those standards focus our attention on promoting 
thinking in terms of the public interest.  In so doing, they suggest how consociational institutions 
might be realised so that they provide not just for conflict management, but also, in the longer term, 
for a deeper sense of democracy and ultimately for conflict resolution.  
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